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Foreword 
A group of eleven Ph.D. candidates from seven countries-Robin Cowan, An- 
drew Foster, Nedka Gateva, William Hodges, Arno Kitts, Eva Lelievre, Fernando 
Rajulton, Lucky Tedrow, Marc Tremblay, John Wilmoth, and Zeng Yi-worked togeth- 
er at IIASA from June 17 through September 6, 1985, in a seminar on population 
heterogeneity. The seminar w a s  led by the  two of us with the  help of Nathan Key- 
fitz, leader  of the  Population Program, and Bradley Gambill, Dianne Goodwin, and 
Alan Bernstein, r e sea rche r s  in t he  Population Program, as w e l l  as t he  occasional 
participation of guest scholars  at IIASA, including Michael Stoto, Sergei  Scherbov, 
Joel Cohen, Frans Willekens, Vladimir Crechuha, and Geert Ridder. Susanne Stock, 
ou r  secre ta ry ,  and Margaret T rabe r  managed the  seminar superbly. 
Each of t h e  eleven students in t h e  seminar succeeded in writing a r e p o r t  on 
the  research  they had done. With only one exception, the  students evaluated the  
seminar as "very productive"; t h e  exception thought i t  w a s  "productive". The two 
of us agree:  the  quality of t he  research  produced exceeded o u r  expectations and 
made the  summer a thoroughly enjoyable experience. W e  were particularly 
pleased by the  interest  and sparkle  displayed in o u r  daily, hour-long colloquium, 
and by t h e  sp i r i t  of cooperation all t he  participants, both students and more 
senior researchers ,  displayed in generously sharing ideas and otherwise helping 
each other .  
Robin Cowan succeeded in producing two papers  ove r  t h e  course of t h e  sum- 
mer, the  present  pape r  on t h e  long run  dynamics of some demographic processes 
being one of them. I t  addresses  an  important question, building on some research  
s ta r ted  at IIASA by W. Brian Arthur. N e w  ideas and f resh  approaches are needed 
in demography: this  pape r  is refreshingly innovative and may w e l l  represent  t h e  
start of a significant direation f o r  productive research .  
Anatoli I. Yashin 
James W. Vaupel 
Abstract 
This is very much a working paper.  I t  presents some preliminary resul ts  hav- 
ing t o  do with the  long run  dynamics of cer tain types of demographic processes.  A 
population i s  heterogeneous with regard  t o  i ts  preferences f o r  two alternatives A 
and B. If the  choice of alternatives displays increasing re turns ,  i.e. the  more one 
of t he  alternatives is chosen the  more at t ract ive i t  becomes, t he  long run  proper-  
t ies  of t he  system 'are,  in general,  not predictable. I t  may, however, have fixed 
points to  one of which t h e  system will converge. The stability of t he  fixed points 
depends very much on the  correlation of the  distribution of original preferences.  
A s  this is work in progress ,  suggested directions f o r  future research  are present- 
ed. 
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Introduction 
Many times in a lifetime an  individual i s  faced with choices between 
alternatives-where t o  go to university, whom t o  marry, whether o r  not to have 
another  child and s o  on. Many of these decisions, when viewed by themselves, have 
no effect on people o the r  than those directly involved. Where I decide t o  go t o  
university may certainly have a n  effect on the  financial s ta tus  of my parents  if 
they are footing the  bill, but i t  i s  very unlikely t o  have any noticeable effect  on 
the  course of history. Neither, from an  individual point of view, is my decision 
likely t o  t o  have any effect  on the  decisions tha t  o the r  people make. These state- 
ments seem unobjectionable when w e  are thinking of some part icular  individual. 
But suppose w e  view the  world as a system, made up of many such individuals. Deci- 
sions can now take  on another  aspect . This aspect  has  t o  do with the  capacity of a 
system of this  s o r t  t o  feed back on itself. What I mean by this i s  t ha t  cumulated in- 
dividual decisions, which by themselves appear  to be independent of each o the r  
and of what comes a f t e r  them, may have a n  effect  on future decisions. This i s  obvi- 
ously t r u e  in many cases: The cumulative ferti l i ty and migration decisions of indi- 
viduals this generation are certainly going t o  have a n  effect  on the  decisions of 
t he  next generation regarding social security,  t o  t ake  a timely example. There 
a r e ,  however, types of decisions where the  engendered effect  is not nearly s o  
clear. I have in mind situations in which decisions with r ega rd  to part icular  
choioes have a n  effect  on the  decisions of future agents with r ega rd  t o  the  same 
choice. For example, when I come t o  choose my school, many people have chosen 
schools before me. Any part icular  individual's decision will have no effect  on 
mine. I t  may be. however, tha t  t he  cumulative effect of t he  decisions of all those 
who have come before me is tha t  one school is large and the  o the r  is smal l .  I t  is 
c l ea r  tha t  if I have preferences with regard  t o  the  size of t he  school t o  which I go, 
this  cumulative effect  will influence my decision making. This type of phenomenon 
is r e f e r r ed  t o  in economics jargon as "returns t o  scale". To talk in terms of pro- 
duction, processes in which the  activity becomes more o r  less efficient as i t  is  
done more are said t o  have increasing o r  decreasing r e tu rns  t o  scale respectively. 
If the  n -th unit of output needs less input than does t h e  n -1-th unit of output, then 
the  production process  has  increasing re turns  t o  scale. The production of chil- 
d ren  might be  a n  example of one such process: A second child i s  almost certainly 
less expensive than a first--one can re-use such things as clothing, furniture,  ba- 
bysitting contacts and s o  on, and one has also accumulated a n  enormous amount of 
knowledge, s o  the  amount of time devoted t o  learning things about child-rearing 
fo r  t he  second child is considerably less than f o r  t he  f i rs t .  The cost  of the second 
child is less than the  cost  of t he  f i rs t ,  s o  w e  say that ,  at least  in this range, child- 
bearing has increasing r e tu rns  t o  scale. My concern here ,  though, is with 
processes tha t  are more social than something like child-rearing. In t he  case of 
child-rearing, t he  r e tu rns  t o  scale a r e  suffered by t h e  parent  who has t he  second 
child. They exis t  because tha t  same parent  has had the  f i r s t  child. If t h e r e  are 
r e tu rns  t o  scale in the  case of t he  choice of university, they will not be  suffered in 
t he  same way. That is t o  say tha t  my choice of Queen's is not going to make Queen's 
look be t te r  o r  worse f o r  me, but it may well do so  f o r  some one who is about t o  
choose where he wants to go to school. This i s  what I mean be  t h e  process  being so- 
cial, as opposed t o  private.  A demonstrative example of this  kind of social r e tu rns  
t o  scale is in the  choice of queues in a bank. A s  I en te r  t h e  bank, I see several  
lines, each of which leads t o  a separa te  te l ler ,  and each of which I might join. 
Clearly the  more people who, p r io r  t o  my arr ival ,  have joined t h e  line t o  teller A, 
relative t o  the  number of people who have joined any of t he  o the r  lines, t he  less 
a t t ract ive line A will be  t o  me. This is an  example of decreasing r e tu rns  t o  scale- 
the more something is done, t he  higher are t he  costs of doing it ,  o r  equivalently, 
t he  lower are the  benefits. (In this  case,  the 'costs' must be  seen in terms of what I 
lose by not choosing a different line.) 
Demography 
There are, I believe, many demographic phenomena which can be described at 
least partially in these terms. A c l ea r  example is the choice of language. In a bil- 
ingual country in which language use has not been w e l l  defined geographically, im- 
migrants have t o  choose which of the  languages they wish t o  learn. A s  well, 
parents  may have t o  decide which language t o  speak at home f o r  t he  purposes of 
teaching the i r  children. This is certainly the case in t he  province of Quebec, (less 
so  since 1977 and the  passage of Bill 101), where e i ther  English o r  French is spo- 
ken, and also in o ther  mainly r u r a l  regions in o the r  provinces of Canada where the  
choice is between English and French (or  often some o the r  language if t he  area i s  
populated largely by immigrants from the  same country.) This phenomenon is com- 
mon t o  many European countries, and also. t o  a much lesser extent,  t o  the  choice 
between English and Spanish in the  southwestern United States.  That t h e r e  a r e  in- 
creasing r e tu rns  to choice of language is c lear :  Choosing the  more common 
language increases one's potential social circle.  Particularly if the  community is 
small, o r  the  proportion of t he  population speaking the  less common language is 
small, choosing the  more common language increases greatly t he  chances tha t  the  
full range of social services-schools, l a w  courts,  hospitals and s o  on, will be  avail- 
able. The more people pick French, t he  more i t  costs t o  speak English. 
Another such phenomenon would be t h e  incidence of divorce. To a person who 
is unhappy in his marriage, t h e r e  are both costs and benefits to getting a divorce. 
I t  r ids  one of unpleasant living situation perhaps, but i t  also makes life more diffi- 
cult  in several  ways: One may lose p a r t  of one's acquaintances; i t  may w e l l  become 
more difficult t o  meet people; if one has children. t h e r e  may be a substantial in- 
crease in the  costs in terms of time spent of looking a f t e r  them; the re  w a s  also (not 
very long ago) a social stigma attached t o  being divorced. Virtually all of these 
problems are t o  some degree  alleviated as more and more people are in t he  state 
of being divorced. A s  a l a rge r  number of divorced people want t o  spend time en- 
gaged in social aativities, t he  number of facilities catering t o  single people r a t h e r  
than t o  couples w i l l  increase. This makes i t  eas ie r  t o  be  single. A s  well, as t h e r e  
are more and more single parents ,  t he  quantity of such things as daycare cent res  
w i l l  increase. (Indeed, i t  becomes possible t o  demand them as p a r t  of contract  
negotiations.) And, as has been apparent  over  t he  past several  decades, the  stig- 
m a  attached t o  divorce slowly disappears. I will not p re s s  this last claim f o r  i t  may 
be disputed tha t  this  is not a causal relationship, tha t  r a t h e r  t he  (exogenously) 
loose morals of t he  times a r e  t he  explanation f o r  t he  disappearance of this stigma, 
not t h e  f a c t  t h a t  many people in t h e  pas t  were willing t o  f a c e  it.  (I doubt t h a t  
morals become loose exogenously, and t h a t  a v e r y  good explanation f o r  t h e  
c u r r e n t  social  acceptabi l i ty  of d ivorce  i s  t h a t  s o  many people have been willing t o  
f a c e  t h e  stigmas of t h e  pas t .  If th is  general  kind of explanation is  c o r r e c t ,  then i t  
will a lso  work t o  explain,  at l eas t  in p a r t ,  t h e  r ising incidence of non-marital coha- 
bitation. I t  seems reasonable  t o  believe t h a t  t h e r e  have always been people who 
would have p r e f e r r e d  cohabitat ion t o  marr iage,  but t h a t  f o r  most of them t h e  
disapprobation suf fe red  would have out-weighed t h e  benefits ,  and s o  they married.  
I t  may a l so  b e  t h a t  f o r  some who would have p r e f e r r e d  i t ,  i t  n e v e r  e n t e r e d  t h e  
realm of possibility, simply because  i t  "wasn't done". F o r  whatever reason ,  
though, t h e r e  came along a n  increasing number of people who fe l t  t h a t  t h e  gains 
overwhelmed t h e  disapprobation and s o  did not b o t h e r  with marriage.  As t h e r e  
came t o  b e  more "normal" people in t h e  state of cohabitat ion,  i t  became more ac- 
ceptable ,  and more  p e o ~ l e  are finding t h a t  t h e  gains, net  of disapprobation,  are 
positive. If th i s  kind of a rmcha i r  sociology i s  c o r r e c t ,  then  we have  a n o t h e r  exam- 
ple  of increasing r e t u r n s  t o  scale . )  
The final example of increasing r e t u r n s  which I will deta i l  h a s  t o  d o  with t h e  
choice  of destination of migrants. In th is  exposition, I a m  thinking primarily of t h e  
emigration which took place  b e f o r e  1920 from Europe,  primarily Grea t  Britain and 
I re land,  t o  t h e  New World. When a n  agent  h a s  decided t o  migrate,  h e  must choose a 
destination. The majority of emigration from t h e  U.K. and I re land had as i t s  desti- 
nation e i t h e r  t h e  United S t a t e s  o r  Canada. I t  seems to m e  t h a t  in t h e  decision 
between t h e  t w o  destinations,  substantial  increasing r e t u r n s  t o  scale might b e  ex- 
pected t o  b e  operat ing.  T h e r e  are severa l  f a c t o r s  involved: In a migration t o  a 
f r o n t i e r ,  i t  seems t o  make good sense  t o  go t o  t h e  more populous place  (assuming 
t h a t  f r o n t i e r  remains t o  b e  se t t led) .  Once on t h e  homestead, a s e t t l e r  would c e r -  
tainly want a reasonably sized sett lement nearby  from which t o  obtain t h e  supplies 
t h a t  h e  could not produce himself--nails, lumber, s u g a r  and s o  on. Though th i s  may 
b e  a n  important f a c t o r  f o r  a c e r t a i n  e r a ,  i t  i s  not appl icable  if t h e  immigrant i s  not 
a homesteader but  r a t h e r  a l aboure r .  In th i s  case, however, t h e r e  are s e v e r a l  
o t h e r  f a c t o r s  contributing t o  increasing r e t u r n s  t o  scale .  Information about  poten- 
t ial  destinations is  v e r y  important to migrants, and i t  i s  c lear ly  e a s i e r  t o  ge t  infor- 
mation about  t h e  p lace  t o  which t h e  l a r g e r  propor t ion of migrants h a s  gone. There  
will b e  more l e t t e r s  home, e i t h e r  to t h e  f u t u r e  migrant himself, o r  t o  h is  f r iends ,  
and local  newspapers will b e  more in teres ted in t h e  a f f a i r s  of t h e  destination in 
which t h e r e  are more expatr io ts .  There  may well b e  information available about  
both places ,  but  if t h e  r e p o r t s  are more or less  equally glowing, t h e n  t h e  destina- 
t ion f o r  which t h e r e  are more r e p o r t s  will b e  s tochast ica l ly  p r e f e r r e d .  Think of 
t h e  potential  migrant  as a r r a n g i n g  his information abou t  e a c h  place  in t w o  
s e p a r a t e  distributions--he h a s  a c e r t a i n  number of observat ions  at e a c h  level  of 
"goodness of destination". Then if t h e  means of t h e  t w o  distr ibutions are approxi-  
mately equal ,  more observa t ions  will d e c r e a s e  t h e  va r i ance ,  and so make t h e  more 
observed  t h e  more  p r e f e r r e d .  T h e r e  i s  also t h e  l a r g e  f a c t o r  of des i r ing to join 
f r i ends  and re la t ives .  In a survey  conducted among immigrants to t h e  United 
S t a t e s  in 1909,  fully 94% of those  asked s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e y  were going to join family 
or f r i ends  (Tomaske). T h e r e  i s  also t h e  f a c t  t h a t  previous  migrants are ab le  to 
remit  passage money to f u t u r e  migrants. In a similar su rvey  to t h e  one mentioned 
above,  30% of those  asked  responded t h a t  t h e i r  passages  had been financially as- 
s i s t ed  by some one  who had  previously migrated (Tomaske). These  f a c t o r s  are all 
indications of increas ing r e t u r n s  to scale. 
I t  i s  clear t h a t  increas ing r e t u r n s  to s c a l e  i s  a f e a t u r e  common to many demo- 
g raph ic  p rocesses ,  and i t  i s  not  at all difficult to find examples in o t h e r  walks of 
life. I t  would b e  su rp r i s ing  indeed,  though, if all of t h e  r e t u r n s  inc reased  in exac t -  
ly t h e  same manner: Changing t h e  p ropor t ion  of pas t  migrants  who have  chosen Ca- 
nada will have  a c e r t a i n  e f f e c t  on  t h e  des i rabi l i ty  of Canada to f u t u r e  migrants. 
This e f fec t  i s  likely to b e  v e r y  di f ferent  from t h e  e f f e c t  on  t h e  des i rabi l i ty  of 
cohabitat ion of changing t h e  p ropor t ion  a l ready  cohabit ing.  I t  would b e  a p p r o p r i -  
ate, then ,  to study t h e  n a t u r e  of p r o c e s s e s  subject  to increas ing r e t u r n s  in as gen- 
eral a way as possible. 
One in teres t ing a s p e c t  of such p r o c e s s e s  i s  t h e i r  long r u n  behaviour .  Does 
t h e  p ropor t ion  of migrants who chose  Canada as t h e i r  dest ination settle down in 
t h e  long r u n ,  or i s  i t  always moving? If all of t h e  members of t h e  population are 
identical ,  as i s  of ten  assumed in demographic analysis ,  then  t h e  answer  is clear--  
eve ryone  does  t h e  same thing t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  pe r son  does.  (If t h e r e  are decreas ing  
r e t u r n s  to sca le ,  th i s  i s  not  necessar i ly  t r u e .  In f a c t  only in unusual c a s e s  will i t  
b e  t rue . )  If ,  however,  t h e  population i s  heterogeneous ,  some analysis  i s  needed 
b e f o r e  such s ta tements  c a n  b e  made. 
In r e c e n t  work,  A r t h u r  (1985a) h a s  analysed a similar  problem having to d o  
with competing technologies.  In h is  model t h e  population i s  divided into t w o  homo- 
geneous sub-groups of equal  size.  These two g roups  are c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by t h e i r  
r e spec t ive  gains from adopting one  or o t h e r  of t w o  competing technologies. The 
total gain to a n  individual from adopting technology A i s  a f fec ted  by t h e  number of 
people who have adopted t h a t  technology before  him. H e r e  again is a system which 
exhibi ts  r e t u r n s  t o  scale .  Ar thur  analysed th is  system under  s e v e r a l  d i f ferent  re- 
t u r n s  regimes, viewing t h e  propor t ion of adop te r s  who have chosen technology A 
as a random walk. He found t h a t  under  regimes of constant  o r  decreas ing r e t u r n s  
t o  scale ,  t h e  propor t ion of t h e  people who have adopted technology A goes t o  1/2 
with probabil i ty 1 as time goes t o  infinity. With unbounded increasing r e t u r n s ,  with 
probabil i ty 1 t h e  propor t ion goes t o  z e r o  o r  one,  but  t o  which i t  goes cannot b e  
predic ted.  Under bounded increasing r e t u r n s ,  t h e  behaviour of t h e  system depends 
v e r y  much on t h e  n a t u r e  of t h e  bounds. 
In r e l a t e d  work, Ar thur  (1985b) h a s  built a model of industrial  location under  
increasing r e t u r n s .  In t h a t  model, a f irm chooses i t s  location based on t h e  in- 
h e r e n t  a t t r ac t iveness  ( to t h a t  firm) of t h e  location, and on t h e  r e t u r n s  t h e  firm re- 
ceives  from t h e r e  being o t h e r  f irms a l ready  located t h e r e .  The firms of th i s  model 
are much more heterogeneous  than t h e  adop te r s  of h is  competing technologies 
model, in t h a t  f irms may d i f fe r  a g r e a t  deal  from e a c h  o t h e r  with r e g a r d  t o  how 
they  view t h e  inherent  a t t r ac t iveness  of a par t i cu la r  location. Ar thur  obtained 
resu l t s  ve ry  similar t o  those  of his competing technologies model. An open ques- 
tion remains,  however, whether  t h e  distr ibution of t h e  p r i o r  tastes of t h e  firms,  o r  
migrants, in pa r t i cu la r  t h e  cor re la t ion  of th is  distr ibution,  can  a f fec t  t h e  outcome. 
I t  i s  th i s  question t h a t  I wish t o  a d d r e s s  in th i s  p a p e r ,  using a var ia t ion of Ar thur ' s  
industrial  location model. (I will talk now only in t e r m s  of migration, but  t h e  
analysis, I think,  is equally applicable,  possibly with minor revisions,  t o  t h e  o t h e r  
phenomena discussed.) These p r i o r  tastes I will r e f e r  t o  as predilections,  and they 
can  b e  seen  as t h e  d e s i r e  a migrant h a s  f o r  one o r  o t h e r  of t h e  destinations,  ignor- 
ing any of t h e  e f fec t s  of r e t u r n s  t o  scale .  W e  might ask  each  potential  migrant, 
"Ignoring any possible considerations having t o  d o  with t h e  number of people al- 
ready  t h e r e ,  how much d o  you want t o  go t o  Canada? How much do you want t o  go t o  
t h e  United States?".  The answers  t o  t h e s e  questions will g e n e r a t e  an  o r d e r e d  p a i r  
f o r  each  potential  migrant, and t h e s e  o r d e r e d  p a i r s  can  b e  mapped onto  t h e  x-y 
plane (see  Figure 1 in which e a c h  point r e p r e s e n t s  a potential  migrant). 
Figure 1. Map of p r e f e r e n c e s  of potential  migrants f o r  two dif ferent  destinations. 
W e  can assume t h a t  t h e s e  predilections form a probabil i ty distr ibution.  Each 
migrant makes his  choice  of destination based on t h e  utility h e  will r ece ive  from 
each  of t h e  two places.  Every  migrant's utilities will be  determined by his predi-  
lections and by t h e  level  of r e t u r n s  t o  sca le  f o r  e a c h  of t h e  two places.  S o  t h e  mi- 
g r a n t  who h a s  predilections (x,y), where x i s  h is  predilection f o r  Canada, y f o r  
t h e  United S ta tes ,  will see his  utility from going t o  Canada as x + HC(Nc), where 
HC(.) i s  some function which r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  r e t u r n s  to scale result ing from 
Canada's population being Nc at t h e  time of h is  choice.  Likewise, his utility from 
going t o  t h e  United S t a t e s  will b e  y + Hu (Nu). When i t  comes time t o  decide where 
t o  go, t h e  migrant simply chooses  t h e  destination which will give him t h e  highest  
utility. 
The Model 
The model i s  v e r y  simple then.  If w e  c h a r a c t e r i z e  each  of t h e  potential  mi- 
g r a n t s  by his  coordinates  on t h e  x -y plane, t h e  migrant Rzy will g o  t o  Canada if 
and only if x + H C  (Nc) 2 y + HU (Nu). Otherwise, RZy will go t o  t h e  United S ta tes .  
From t h e  migrants'  point of view, at t h e  time of his d e p a r t u r e ,  h is  destination is  
perfect ly  determined--he knows Nc and Nu, so h e  simply works out  x + (N,) and 
y + HU (.nl,), and goes to t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  place.  From t h e  point of view of a n  ob- 
s e r v e r ,  however, t h e  system is  not s o  predic table .  The problem i s  t h a t  t h e  ob- 
s e r v e r  does not know which migrant i s  next .  If w e  knew t h e  o r d e r  of t h e  Rzy 's, t h e  
system would b e  completely deterministic. But t h e  o r d e r  i s  random--to t h e  ob- 
s e r v e r ,  t h e  next  migrant a p p e a r s  t o  b e  drawn randomly from t h e  distr ibution of mi- 
grants .  W e  can,  however, make probabil ist ic statements about  t h e  next  Rzy .
Since w e  are in te res ted  in t h e  dynamics of t h e  system and  not t h e  migrants 
themselves, t h e  next  Rzy i s  not real ly  t h a t  important,  o r  r a t h e r  i s  s o  only inciden- 
tally. What w e  rea l ly  c a r e  about  i s  whether o r  not t h e  nex t  migrant goes t o  Cana- 
da .  S o  what w e  want t o  know is  whether f o r  t h e  next migrant 
z + HC(Nc) r y + H"(NU). And if w e  know N, and Nu, w e  c a n  make probabil ist ic 
statements about  this.  
At th i s  point, i t  would b e  well t o  think about  t h e  na tu re  of t h e  increasing re- 
t u r n s  t o  sca le  functions HU and p. What w e  actually c a r e  about  i s  t h e  inequality 
z + HC (N,) $ y + XY (Nu ). This can b e  r e a r r a n g e d  t o  z f y + [XY (Nu ) - b (Nc )]. 
Let us l e t  G (Nc ,Nu) = [H" (lk, ) - HC (N,)]. G (Nc ,Nu) tells us how much more t h e  
United S t a t e s  h a s  gained from r e t u r n s  t o  scale than  Canada h a s  at t h e  levels of po- 
pulation c u r r e n t  in t h e  two countries.  In o t h e r  words, f o r  a potential  migrant 
whose predilections show no p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  e i t h e r  of t h e  destinations,  (i.e. z = 
y ) ,  G(Nc,Nu) will tell us  how much h e  p r e f e r s  t h e  United S t a t e s  t o  Canada at t h e  
population levels Nu and N,, respectively.  W e  would, I think, expec t  G t o  b e  a 
function of t h e  r a t i o s  of t h e  two populations. The r e a s o n  f o r  th is  i s  t h a t  in t h e  
eyes  of a potential  migrant, t h e  di f ference between 1000 and 1100 is  much bigger  
than is  t h e  di f ference between 100,000 and 100,100. This i s  t r u e  f o r  two reasons:  
Of any one of his f r i ends  who have migrated,  t h e  probabil i ty t h a t  t h e  f r iend h a s  
gone t o  Canada will b e  equal t o  t h e  propor t ion of t h e  to ta l  migrant population t h a t  
h a s  gone t o  Canada. (This i s  from t h e  point of view of t h e  o b s e r v e r  who does  not 
know who t h e  next  migrant will be ,  and s o  knows nothing about h is  fr iendship net-  
works.) The second reason  h a s  t o  d o  with t h e  se rv ices  provided in each of t h e  two 
places. Suppose t h a t  Nu - Nc = g ,  where g i s  a positive constant.  We would ex- 
pec t  t h a t  t h e  level  of se rv ices  available in t h e  United S t a t e s  would b e  h igher  than  
in Canada. I t  would a l so  make sense ,  though, t o  believe t h a t  t h e  di f ference in t h e  
levels of se rv ices  available would b e  g r e a t e r ,  t h e  smaller  i s  Nu. Suppose we think 
in terms of d i s c r e t e  levels of se rv ices ,  which have population thresholds  associat-  
e d  with them. That is ,  when a population threshold  is  r eached ,  t h e  nex t  level  of 
s e r v i c e s  is  added. This i s  one of t h e  notions underlying h i e r a r c h y  models in re- 
gional economics (Richardson, 1973). I t  i s  likely t h a t  t h e  thresholds  a r e  c l o s e r  to- 
g e t h e r  (in t e rms  of absolute  numbers) at lower levels of population. By t h e  time 
t h e  population h a s  reached  100,000 w e  would not b e  likely t o  g e t  t h e  next  level  of 
se rv ices  by adding 100 people. I t  is f a r  more likely t o  b e  t r u e  tha t  adding 100 peo- 
ple  does  make th i s  d i f ference when w e  begin with a population of 1000. 
I assume now t h a t  t h e  r e t u r n s  t o  sca le  are t h e  same in t h e  two countries.  This 
1 
means t h a t  G ( N c , N u )  i s  symmetric about - S o  if N  i s  t h e  to ta l  number of migrants 
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( N  = N c  + N u )  then  G ( a N , ( l  - a ) N )  = - G ( ( l  - a ) N , a N ) .  Thus, G ( . 5 N ,  . 5 N )  = O .  
Since G  measures how much ahead  one of t h e  countr ies  i s  in t h e  r e t u r n s  t o  sca le  
race, w e  need only say  t h a t  G  i s  positive if t h e  country  r e p r e s e n t e d  by t h e  f i r s t  
argument h a s  t h e  l a r g e r  population. The names of t h e  countr ies  d o  not matter. 
The convention I will adopt  i s  tha t  Canada will t a k e  t h e  f i r s t  argument,  and s o  when 
t h e  population of Canada is  l a r g e r ,  G  i s  positive. One more important simplifica- 
tion, I will assume t h a t  G  i s  not a function of t h e  to ta l  s ize  of t h e  migrant popula- 
tion, and s o  w e  can  write G ( a N ,  ( 1  - a ) N )  = H ( a ) ,  where a i s  t h e  propor t ion of mi- 
g r a n t s  who have gone t o  Canada. Since w e  are looking at systems which display in- 
creas ing r e t u r n s ,  as one  of t h e  destinations ge t s  ahead in population, i t  ge t s  ahead 
in a t t r ac t iveness ,  so  H  i s  increasing in a. I assume t h a t  i t  i s  monotone. 
I r e t u r n  now t o  t h e  distr ibution of predilections.  With r e g a r d  t o  predilections 
alone,  each  migrant finds one  of t h e  two possible destinations p r e f e r a b l e  t o  t h e  
o t h e r .  T h e r e  will a l so  b e  some migrants who are indifferent between t h e  two. This 
set of potential  migrants will b e  mapped onto  a r a y  running through t h e  origin at 
45". Along this  r a y ,  which I will r e f e r  t o  as t h e  r a y  of indifference,  x = y .  Anyone 
below this  r a y  p r e f e r s  Canada, anyone above i t  p r e f e r s  t h e  United S ta tes .  N o w  w e  
t a k e  account of t h e  increasing r e t u r n s  function. If a > . 5 ,  t h e r e  are more people 
in Canada. This means t h a t  f o r  anyone whose predilections lay on t h e  line of in- 
1 difference,  Canada is  now p r e f e r r e d  s ince  H ( a )  > 0 f o r  a > - In fac t ,  t h e  whole 
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distr ibution is  shifted t o  t h e  r igh t ,  s ince  f o r  e v e r y  potential  migrant t h e r e  is  t h e  
same added bonus f o r  going t o  Canada. Similarly, if a < .5,  t h e r e  are more people 
in t h e  United S ta tes ,  and s o  t h e  US looks b e t t e r  than  Canada t o  those  who were 
previously indifferent.  The US gains in everyone's  eyes ,  s o  t h e  distr ibution shi f ts  
up. This shifting of t h e  distr ibution up o r  t o  t h e  r igh t ,  can b e  seen  as equivalent t o  
moving t h e  r a y  of indifference down o r  up respect ively ,  s ince  what w e  are in- 
t e r e s t e d  in is  actually who p r e f e r s  Canada, and who p r e f e r s  t h e  United S ta tes .  The 
r a y  of indifference divides t h e  distr ibution of migrants into these  two groups,  s o  if 
t h e  distr ibution is  shi f ted  pointwise by a constant,  i t  i s  equivalent t o  shifting t h e  
dividing line. Now t o  make l ife easy,  w e  can  simply sca le  H ( a )  s o  t h a t  i t  i s  equal t o  
t h e  shift  of t h e  r a y  of indifference (see Figure 2, which is  t h e  distribution of Fig- 
ure 1 with contour  lines drawn on it). Since t h e  next  migrant is  drawn from t h e  dis- 
tr ibution, t h e  probability tha t  he  p re fe r s  Canada is  equal to t h e  mass of t he  distri-  
bution which falls below t h e  r a y  of indifference. S o  to make probabilistic state- 
ments about t h e  destination of t h e  next migrant, if w e  know t h e  initial distribution 
of predilections, w e  need only know the  location of t h e  r a y  of indifference. This i s  
a function of t h e  proport ion of migrants who have a l ready  gone to Canada. W e  
have now come full c i rc le ,  and the  feedback na tu re  of t h e  system is apparent.  
prefer U.S. / ray  of  indifference 
I 
predilection 
for  U.S. 
prefer  Ceneda 
- - 
predilection for  Can 
Figure 2. Map of preferences  of potential migrants fo r  two different  destinations. 
Results of the Podel 
Here  i t  would b e  nice to begin an examination of a gener ic  probability distri- 
bution in o r d e r  to look at t h e  dynamics of such a system. The interesting questions 
have  to do with fixed points. From recen t  resu l t s  of Arthur ,  Ermoliev and 
Kaniovski (1985). w e  know tha t  with probability one, a model such as h a s  been 
descr ibed will s e t t l e  down to a stable  fixed point. By a fixed point, I mean a value 
of a such tha t  t h e  probability tha t  t h e  next migrant goes to Canada is  equal to a. 
What th i s  means is tha t  t h e r e  is  no systematic tendency f o r  t h e  proportion of t h e  
migrant population in Canada to change. If fixed points exis t ,  and particularly if 
they a r e  s table ,  then w e  may be able t o  make statements about t he  long run  
behaviour of the relative sizes of the  populations of Canada and the  United States.  
Unfortunately, at this s tage  of r e sea rch ,  a generic probability distribution is 
beyond r each ,  s o  I have r e t r ea t ed  t o  a part icular  distribution. The distribution I 
use is Gumbel's bivariate exponential distribution (Johnson and Kotz, 1972, pp. 
262). A bivariate exponential distribution i s  not wholly unreasonable if w e  ap- 
propriately choose t he  population about which to  be  concerned. Suppose the  po- 
pulation are those people who have definitely decided t o  migrate. The decision 
process might be character ised as follows: Conditions in t he  home country become 
s o  bad tha t  migration is decided upon--people believe t ha t  no matter how many peo- 
ple t h e r e  are in t he  N e w  World, conditions t he re  are be t t e r  than they are in t he  
Old World. Then, having become potential migrants, people examine the  popula- 
tions in t he  two possible destinations t o  decide which would be  t he  be t t e r  place t o  
go. This i s  c lear ly  a model of push-migration, in tha t  t he  momentum t o  migrate is  
generated in t he  source  country. This is  most appropr ia te  in situations like t he  Ir-  
ish potato famine, o r  f o r  migrations due t o  religious persecution. The stochastic 
process  of a pull-migration model has a different na ture  and s o  produces different 
results.' The exponential na ture  of t he  distribution implies t ha t  t h e r e  are many 
people who have predilections which map them to  points which are nea r  the  origin. 
In o the r  words, many people do not have very s t rong predilections, though t h e r e  
are a f e w  fo r  whom they are very strong. 
The joint distribution of predilections, then, is  assumed t o  be  
And so  
P r (Y<y  I X = x )  = [ 1  -/3(2e-z-1)][1 - e y ]  + B(2eZ -1 ) (1  - e - 2 ~ )  , 
where is  4 times t he  correlation coefficient, and is  res t r ic ted  t o  [-1,1]. (This un- 
-1 1 fortunately r e s t r i c t s  t he  correlation of the  distribution t o  [- -1.) A s  noted be- 
4 ' 4  
fore ,  the  probability tha t  t he  next migrant goes t o  Canada is  t he  m a s s  of the  distri- 
 or example i f  all migrants  are  pulled b y  r e l a t i v e s  who have prev ious ly  migra ted ,  and t h e  order  
in which previous migrants  "pull" i s  not pre-determined, then  t h e  migrat ion looks  l i k e  a  Polya pro- 
c e s s ,  and t h e  proportion o f  migrants  in  Canada can s e t t l e  down t o  any point in t h e  in terva l  [0,1]. 
I f ,  however ,  some portion o f  t h e  migrants  a r e  not pulled, but choose randomly between des t ina t ions  
I 
I (and then pull t h e i r  r e l a t i v e s ) ,  t h e  proportion o f  migrants  in  Canada wil l  go t o  - I am gra te fu l  t o  2 ' 
Brian Arthur f o r  t h i s  point.  
bution below t h e  r a y  of indifference.  This r a y  is t h e  line Y = x + H(a) .  S o  what 
w e  want t o  know is  Pr (Y < x + H(a)) .  A s  a n  intermediate s t ep ,  if w e  set H(a)  = h ,  
w e  can  write 
To find t h e  unconditional probabil i ty,  w e  must in tegra te  o v e r  x E (0,00) t o  g e t  
where t h e  final e i s  from t h e  marginal distr ibution of X. 
After much smoke c l e a r s ,  and let t ing Pr (Y < x + h )  equal Q ( a ) ,  w e  find t h a t  
Q ( a )  maps from t h e  in terval  [0,3.] onto [0,3.] and is  continuous, s o  by Brower's 
fixed point theorem, w e  know t h a t  at l eas t  one fixed point exis ts .  That i s ,  t h e r e  i s  
0 
some a such t h a t  if t h e  propor t ion of pas t  migrants who have gone t o  Canada i s  
0 0 
equal t o  a,  then t h e  probabil i ty t h a t  t h e  nex t  migrant goes t o  Canada i s  equal t o  a. 
I We s ta ted  e a r l i e r  t h a t  H(') = 0. Substituting th i s  into Q ( a ) ,  where a  = - 2 2 ' 
1  
w e  find t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a f ixed point at a = - Due t o  t h e  symmetry of t h e  problem, 
2 ' 
both in t h e  distr ibution and in t h e  r e t u r n s  t o  scale ,  th i s  i s  not surpr is ing.  Because 
t h e  problem is  s o  symmetric, when w e  are looking f o r  fixed points and t h e i r  pro-  
p e r t i e s ,  w e  need only look on one s ide  of t h e  midpoint. That i s  t o  say  t h a t  w e  can 
1  
concen t ra te  o u r  a t tent ion on t h e  in terval  [-,I] .  
2 
One of t h e  important questions t o  ask about  f ixed points i s  whether  o r  not they  
are a t t r a c t o r s .  From r e c e n t  resu l t s  by Hill, Lane and Sudder th  (1980), w e  know 
t h a t  a fixed point i s  a n  a t t r a c t o r  if and only if i t  i s  a downcrossing of t h e  diagonal, 
i .e. if t h e  slope of t h e  function Q ( a )  i s  l e s s  than 1  at t h e  fixed point. (The set of at- 
t r a c t o r s  is t h e  set of points t o  which t h e  system will converge with non-zero proba-  
bility .) 
1  I will f i r s t  examine t h e  point a  = - and then t u r n  my at tent ion t o  o t h e r  possi- 2 
ble  f ixed points. What w e  need t o  know in o r d e r  t o  t e l l  if a fixed point i s  a n  attrac- 
tor or not,  i s  t h e  slope of t h e  function Q ( a )  at t h a t  point. Differentiating Q ( a )  with 
r e s p e c t  to a we g e t  
When is  th is  quanti ty g r e a t e r  than  I? Using t h e  bounds on 8,  we can  say t h a t  
I t  is  no s u r p r i s e  t h a t  t h e  slope of Q ( a )  depends crucial ly on t h e  r e t u r n s  function 
H ( a ) .  T h e r e  are s e v e r a l  conditions. though, under  which we can  draw conclusions 
I 
about  whether  or not - i s  a n  a t t r a c t o r .  
2  
dH 1 )  If - 1 > 3 at a = - then - 1 2  aQ > 1 so - i s  a n  upcrossing,  and so is not a n  at- d a  aa 2  
t r a c t o r .  In o t h e r  words, if increasing r e t u r n s  come into play v e r y  quickly 
and v e r y  powerfully, then  with probabil i ty 1 t h e  system will move away from 
1 t h e  point -. This i s  as one  would expect--if t h e r e  are v e r y  l a r g e  gains to go- 2  
ing to t h e  more populous place,  then i t  seems v e r y  unlikely t h a t  t h e  population 
will remain equally divided between t h e  two places.  
dH 3 2 )  If - 1 1 2 ' aQ < 1, so - i s  a downcrossing and so i s  a n  at- < - at a = - then  -d a  2  aa 2  
1 
t r a c t o r .  In o t h e r  words, if t h e  increasing r e t u r n s  are small n e a r  - then  t h e  2  ' 
randomness of t h e  o r d e r  of migration will, with probabil i ty 1, keep  t h e  pro-  
1 por t ions  at - (given t h a t  t h a t  i s  where  we start t h e  system from). 2 
3) I f - < -  1 dH 5 3,  then  whether  or not - i s  a n  a t t r a c t o r  depends solely on 8. To 2 d a  2  
find t h a t  dependency,  we simply t a k e  t h e  der ivat ive  of aQ with r e s p e c t  to 8 ,  
aa 
1 
at t h e  value a = - 
2  
This value is  non-negative, s ince  we have assumed t h a t  H ( a )  i s  a monotonically 
increasing function. If we a l so  assume tha t  increasing r e t u r n s  t o  scale  a r e  
1 a a~ 
operat ive  at a l l  points n e a r  - then -(-) i s  s t r i c t ly  positive. What th is  
2 ' ag aa 
means is  t h a t  t h e  h igher  (positive) is t h e  corre la t ion of t h e  distr ibution of 
predilections,  t h e  l e ss  likely (where the  "sample space"  is the  set of functions 
1 H ( a ) )  i t  i s  tha t  t h e  system will se t t l e  down t o  -. This seems reasonable.  If t h e  
2 
1 
corre la t ion is high,  (but symmetric about -) then t h e r e  are many people 
2 
whose predilections give close t o  equal value t o  Canada and t h e  United S ta tes .  
They will readily change t h e i r  p re fe rences ,  and s o  send t h e  propor t ion of po- 
l tential  migrants who p r e f e r  Canada away from - if t h e  population of one 
2 
country  ge t s  slightly l a r g e r  than t h e  o t h e r .  If ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e  distr i-  
bution of predilections h a s  a small (high negative) cor re la t ion ,  then t h e r e  are 
relat ively many people who have s t rong predilections and s o  will not easily 
change t h e i r  p re fe rences .  For  many of them, t h e i r  predilections will outweigh 
t h e  r e t u r n s  t o  sca le  when i t  i s  time t o  make t h e i r  choice.  (It i s  important t o  
remember,  in th is  r e g a r d ,  tha t  if choice of destination were based on predi-  
1 lections alone,  t h e  propor t ion of migrants in Canada would go t o  - with pro-  
2 
bability 1 ,  due t o  t h e  symmetry of t h e  distribution.) 
1 Something worth noting i s  tha t ,  as w e  can see from Figure 3, if - i s  not a n  at- 
2 
1 1 t r a c t o r ,  then t h e r e  must be  more fixed points in t h e  r a n g e  (-,I]. If - i s  not a n  at- 
2 2 
t r a c t o r  then i t  i s  un upcrossing,  s o  Q ( a )  must re-cross  t h e  diagonal, possibly at 1, 
1 in o r d e r  t h a t  i t  b e  defined on t h e  whole range  [-,I]. 
2 
Figure 3. Probability that  next migrant goes t o  Canada as  a function of proportion 
of migrant population currently in Canada. 
I turn attention now t o  o ther  fixed points. One of the  reasons f o r  undertaking 
this enterprise w a s  t o  examine the long run behaviour of this type of system. One 
very interesting event would be that  in the long run all of the migrants went t o  the 
same destination. I ask now what would be necessary fo r  this t o  take  place. In oth- 
er words, under what conditions is 1 (or 0) a an attracting fixed point? If 1 is a 
fixed point, then 
o r  equivalently, 
There are two possible solutions. The f irs t  is  that e-H( l )  = 0. In this case, 
H(1) = -. O r  more properly, lim H(a )  = -. This implies that the  increasing re- 
a -1 
- k - L  or turns t o  scale are unbounded. The second solution is that e 4 ( l )  - 6 2 '  
tha t  -H(l) = ln($ - $). If this solution i s  t o  be  w e l l  defined. then i t  must be  that  
( - ) 0 O r  that 6 2 3. But there  is  a restriction (coming from the  specifica- 6 2 
tion of the  distribution) that  -1 S 6 S 1. Thus the second soiution is  never w e l l  de- 
fined, so  the  only condition under which 1 i s  a fixed point is that the  increasing re- 
t u r n s  t o  scale  b e  unbounded, so  tha t  H ( l )  = 0.  This s tands  t o  reason:  Any out l iers  
in t h e  distr ibution indicate ve ry  s t rong  predilections f o r  one  of t h e  two destina- 
tions. If t h e  r e t u r n s  are bounded, by finite m say ,  then  t h e r e  will b e  some poten- 
t ial  migrants whose predilections f o r  t h e  United S t a t e s  are g r e a t e r  than m ,  since 
t h e  distribution has  infinite tai ls .  These migrants in t h e  tai ls  make up a fixed pro- 
portion of t h e  to ta l  migrant population, s o  t h e  propor t ion who go t o  Canada can 
never  ge t  t o  1--these out l iers  will always go t o  t h e  United Sta tes .  
If 1 i s  f ixed,  i s  i t  a n  a t t r a c t o r ?  To answer th is  question, w e  need t o  know 
whether Q ( a )  approaches  1 from above o r  below t h e  r a y  Q ( a )  = a .  Equivalently, 
w e  need t o  know whether t h e  slope at 1 is less  than o r  g r e a t e r  than 1. 
d Q !  s i n c e  lim [ l e - H ( a )  + +(-e-H(a) + ~e- 'H(a)) l  = 0 ,  then if < w , xia=, = 0.2 da 
and 1 i s  s table .  There  are, however, functions H ( a )  such t h a t  H ( l )  = but  
d Q  ; 
-, a=1 = 0.  In th is  case ,  i t  must b e  t h a t  da 
This inequality places  a n  u p p e r  bound on t h e  speed at which H ( a )  inc reases  as a 
approaches  1. 
I We can see from Figure 4 t h a t  if both - and 1 are not a t t r a c t o r s ,  ( 1  need not 
2 
b e  a fixed point f o r  th is  t o  b e  t r u e )  then t h e r e  must be  an  a t t r ac t ing  fixed point 
0 1 O 0 between them. That i s  t o  say  t h a t  t h e r e  exis ts  a n  a such t h a t  - < a < 1 and a i s  2 
both fixed and a t t r ac t ing .  
Figure 4. Probability tha t  next migrant goes t o  Canada as function of proportion of 
migrant population currently in Canada. 
A t  such a point, i t  must be  tha t  
0 
This is quadratic in e -H(a ) ,  s o  we can solve t o  get  
Unfortunately we cannot say very much about this without specifying H ( a )  more 
fully than has  been done, and observing tha t  t he  value 8 = 0 will need special 
0 
treatment. I t  is  worth noting, though, tha t  the  value a will be  a function of 8, and 
s o  of the  correlat ion of the  distribution. 
Discussion 
P a r t  of t he  purpose of this paper  has  been t o  demonstrate tha t  in a demo- 
graphic process  which exhibits increasing r e tu rns  t o  scale ,  the  long run outcome 
of the  process  is not always deterministic. We have examined some cases h e r e  in 
which one can  make probabilistic statements about t h e  outcome, but not much 
more. P a r t  of t h e  reason f o r  t h e  lack of specific statements has  been t h e  general-  
ity of t h e  model. Were t h e  increasing r e t u r n s  function t o  b e  specified more fully, 
more detail  could be  given about t h e  outcome of t h e  process .  I t  i s  c l e a r ,  though, 
t h a t  in a system of t h e  type which h a s  been modelled h e r e ,  i t  i s  not generally t r u e  
tha t  w e  can predic t  t h e  outcome. There  will b e  pa r t i cu la r  cases  in which w e  can,  (if 
1 
t h e  only fixed point i s  - f o r  example) but in general  t h e  bes t  w e  will be  ab le  t o  d o  
2 
i s  t o  specify t h e  set of points t o  which t h e r e  is  a positive probabil i ty t h a t  t h e  sys- 
t e m  will converge.  
One interesting resul t  t h a t  has  appeared  is  t h e  relat ionship between t h e  con- 
vergence points of t h e  system and t h e  corre la t ion of t h e  distr ibution of predilec- 
tions. Differences in predilections was t h e  way in which o u r  population was 
heterogeneous.  The inference t h a t  might b e  drawn from this  i s  t h a t  t h e  form of 
heterogeneity i s  important t o  t h e  long r u n  dynamics of population systems. In th i s  
model, t h e  di f ferences  t h a t  matter t ake  a par t i cu la r  form--namely t h e  corre la t ion 
between t h e  p r i o r  utilities gained from each of t h e  two destinations. One might b e  
tempted t o  suppose t h a t  t h e  more similar t h e  individuals of a population are, t h e  
more likely t h e  population i s  t o  behave like a homogeneous one. In th i s  model, 
however, what i s  c ruc ia l  i s  how each individual views t h e  two a l ternat ives .  The po- 
pulation may b e  very  d iverse  with r e g a r d  t o  t h e  level  af a t t ract iveness  of migra- 
tion (i.e.,  t h e  distance from t h e  origin of t h e  o r d e r e d  p a i r s  ( z  , y )), but if each in- 
dividual i s  indifferent between t h e  two destinations (i.e., z = y ) ,  then t h e  popula- 
tion will a p p e a r  t o  b e  homogeneous. 
There  are two next  s t e p s  in th is  r e s e a r c h .  The f i r s t  i s  t o  analyse t h e  re la-  
tionship between t h e  cor re la t ion  of t h e  distribution and t h e  location of a r b i t r a r y  
(non-extreme) fixed points. The second is  t o  general ise  t h e  resu l t s  t o  o t h e r  less  
r e s t r i c t e d  probabil i ty distr ibutions.  I suspect  t h a t  t h e  same s o r t  of relat ionship 
between t h e  corre la t ion of t h e  distribution and fixed points will emerge. 
The final r emarks  have t o  d o  with migration. In th is  model, migration has  been 
t r e a t e d  as a p u r e  b i r th  process--People are born with r e g a r d  t o  t h e  N e w  World 
when they a r r i v e  t h e r e .  Where they are "born" depends, in t h e  funny way 
descr ibed,  on t h e  populations of people a l ready  in each  of t h e  two countries.  Un- 
fortunately,  with r e g a r d  t o  migration, people a lso  "die", t h a t  i s  t o  say ,  emigrate. 
In a fully blown model of migration, th is  should b e  taken into account.  (It is a lso  
t r u e  t h a t  mortality has  been ignored. Including mortality will not a f fec t  t h e  
resu l t s  if w e  assume t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no a g e  bias t o  t h e  choice  of destination, and t h a t  
both countr ies  su f fe r  t h e  same mortality schedule.) I think t h a t  i t  can  b e  a rgued  
t h a t  in t h e  per iod t h a t  I have  been r e f e r r i n g  to, emigration did not  play t h a t  big a 
ro le .  I t  is  t r u e  t h a t  Canada lost  population through emigration to t h e  United 
S ta tes ,  but  t h e r e  is  r eason  to believe t h a t  t h e  U.S. w a s  t h e  original  destination of 
many of t h e s e  people,  but  because  of di f fe rences  in t h e  regulations governing 
passenger  t r a f f i c  between Grea t  Britain and t h e  N e w  World, they found i t  c h e a p e r  
to t r a v e l  through Canada. I have ignored emigration h e r e  because  I have been 
trying to isolate t h e  e f fec t s  on a par t i cu la r  type  of system of increasing r e t u r n s  t o  
scale .  Migration cer ta in ly  exhibi ts  increasing r e t u r n s ,  and t o  t h e  ex ten t  t h a t  they 
are a n  important f a c t o r ,  and to t h e  ex ten t  t h a t  t h e  population is  heterogeneous  in 
t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  way, i t  (and many o t h e r  demographic processes)  can  b e  analysed 
using t h e  type  of model set out  h e r e .  
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